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31. Introduction
On the 31st of August 2015, Hungarian authorities closed down the Budapest’s Keleti train 
station to asylum seekers who were making their way to northern European countries. Riot 
police blocked entrance to trains. The trains already heading to the Austrian border were 
intercepted and the asylum seekers were ordered off. As a result, thousands got stranded in the 
already overpopulated make-shift refugee camp surrounding Keleti. In the following days the 
living conditions at Keleti got worse. On September 4, with no foreseeable solutions to their 
problems, refugees took action. Under live media coverage, hundreds started marching on foot 
towards the Austrian border 150 km away1. Their aim was to show to the world that they do not 
accept their predicament and cross the Austrian border towards reaching Germany and Sweden, 
where they believed their claims of asylum would be better received. 
Two factors played a key role for refugees to take action. First, there was increasing 
attention by the European public to the plight of refugees. On the 27th of August more than 70 
migrants were found dead inside a lorry left by the side of an Austrian motorway2. On the 2nd 
of September the dead body of Aylan Kurdi, a Syrian boy who drowned after a boat was turned 
over while attempting to reach Greece, was found on the coast of Turkey3. As disturbing images 
of these tragic events hit the media, solidarity campaigns across Europe got major support. 
Networks such as the Airbnb for refugees group was overwhelmed by offers of help4. People 
took to the street to raise awareness of the problems of asylum seekers. Second, between the 
31st of August and the 1st of September, asylum seekers have seen what public opinion is able 
to achieve. For that period of two days, pressure from European citizens lead Hungarian and 
Austrian authorities to waive visa checks5. 
The march resulted in another brief period between the 4th and the 5th of September where 
the border controls were waived. The Hungarian authorities provided transportation to the 
Austrian border for those who were on the march as well as those who remained back. Both in 
Austria and Germany, cheering crowds greeted the refugees, solidarity networks provided food, 
water, supplies and accommodation. The period ended when, on the 5th of September, 
Hungarian authorities declared that there were no more buses for marching refugees. Austria 
closed its borders with Hungary as Germany reinstated controls at the Austrian border. Within 
two weeks, the European Union announced plans for new detention measures. Hungary 
completed its wall at its border with Serbia, not letting in any more asylum seekers.  
1 Emma Graham – Harrison, “At Keleti station in Budapest, the refugees could wait no longer”. Guardian 
September 6, 2015. 
2 Luke Harding, “Police fear as many as 50 migrants dead inside lorry left by Austrian motorway”. 
Guardian August 28, 2015.  
3 Helena Smith, “Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees”. Guardian 
September 2, 2015. 
4 Jessica Elgot, “‘Airbnb for refugees’ group overwhelmed by offers of help”. Guardian September 1, 
2015.  
5 Guardian, “Packed trains reach Germany as refugee visa checks are waived”. Guardian September 1, 
2015.  
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How should we understand the march of the refugees and the events surrounding it? In what 
ways has the refugee’s traversing the borders altered the European public’s perception of 
asylum seekers and the institutions that are in place to govern asylum policy6? In this article, I 
aim to show that the march of refugees should be characterized as an act of civil disobedience. I 
argue that asylum seekers, with the help of European institutions and activist European citizens, 
have emerged as novel political agents instigating change in the European system of asylum. 
This claim may seem in contrast with common convictions regarding both acts of civil 
disobedience and asylum seekers. Acts of civil disobedience that essentially involve breaking 
the law are not easily legitimized. The most common justification is that the act furthers the 
interests of the public. Asylum seekers are not members of the European public. How can they 
know where the interest of the public lies or claim to further it? How can they be entitled to 
break the law?  
I provide an answer to these questions by responding to the body of literature that has 
flourished after John Rawls’ account of civil disobedience in A Theory of Justice (1971). In 
Section Two, I discuss the features of the march. I show that it was conscientious and 
communicative as any paradigmatic case of civil disobedience. In Section Three, I explore its 
moral aspects. My aim is to offer a justification for an act of civil disobedience that is available 
also to non-members without diverging from the idea that it is the exclusive right of the 
European citizens to participate in determining the policies that govern the European 
institutions. Instead of the conventional grounding of the right to civil disobedience on the right 
to political participation, my approach is consequentialist. I emphasize that acts of civil 
disobedience are epistemically valuable tools for societies to reconsider their set of values that 
might be grounded in local parochialism. If European citizens take into consideration the points 
of view of asylum seekers advanced by acts of civil disobediences such as the march of 
refugees, they will better realize their right to govern themselves. In addition, I show that the 
epistemic value can only be sustained by recognizing a moral right to civil disobedience to non-
members. In Section Four, I conclude by emphasizing that conceptualizing the march as an act 
of civil disobedience is significant in recognizing asylum seekers as novel political agents that 
demand redress of an injustice, rather than plea for humanitarian aid.  
2. Features of the march as a paradigmatic case of civil disobedience 
The notion of civil disobedience is not easy to pinpoint. Despite various attempts in the 
literature, there is no consensus on a clear cut definition of civil disobedience in virtue of which 
we can distinguish it from other kinds of political action that involve breaching the law. 
Nevertheless, it is generally recognizes that two features, conscientiousness and communication, 
are shared in paradigm cases of civil disobedience (Brownlee 2004, 338-340). In this Section I 
explore to what degree the march was a conscientious and communicative act. This 
investigation also allows us to delineate what makes the march worthy of special attention 
                                                            
6 Here ‘refugees traversing borders’ invokes Engin Isin’s conceptualization of acts that traverse “not only 
actual frontiers (borders, boundaries, zones) but also virtual (or symbolic) frontiers by acting in place of 
or against how they are supposed to act”. (Isin 2012, 14). 
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among the series of events that both asylum seekers and the European public experienced since 
2015. 
2.1 Was the march conscientious? 
Kimberly Brownlee maintains that conscientiousness in an act of civil disobedience “takes 
the form of a sincere and serious belief that a law or policy warrants revision and that the values 
that underpin that belief are sufficiently weighty to require a breach of law in their defense” 
(Brownlee 2004, 341). Some characteristics of a sincere and serious belief for Brownlee are 
“constancy, a degree of self-sacrifice, a willingness to take risks, a spontaneous response to 
opposition, and a capacity to defend the reasons for engaging in the pursuit”. Were asylum 
seekers sincere and serious in their beliefs that their predicament at Keleti station was 
unacceptable and the policy required revision? It is important to give a convincing answer to 
this question, for sincerity and seriousness play a major role in the eyes of the public as much as 
the social scientist. If asylum seekers were not sincere in their beliefs, then they were exploiting 
the European public to achieve their own aims. If they were not serious, then their beliefs could 
not have constituted any incentive to tolerate their breaking of the law.  
We can suggest that the asylum seekers were serious in their beliefs by pointing at the kind 
of risks that they were willing to accept when they acted based on their beliefs. The march, 
which involved more than a 150 km. walk to the Austrian border without any infrastructure 
available to support them, was laborious for families that included children, elderly and injured 
that needed medical attention7. Moreover, it implied legal and political consequences that 
asylum seekers were ready to face. The memories of the week previous to the march, when 
Hungarian authorities intercepted and sent all asylum seekers leaving Keleti station to refugee 
camps, were still vivid in their minds8. The fact that such hardship and risk did not hold them 
back is a clear sign of seriousness.  
Making the case that asylum seekers were sincere is trickier. The march was spontaneous, 
and in many instances, asylum seekers defended their reasons for engaging in the march. Yet, 
these two are aspects are not enough to establish sincerity. There is a common conviction 
usually voiced by political groups against the reception of asylum seekers in EU territory that 
those who have marched out of the Keleti station were acting on behalf of their vested interests, 
rather than on moral considerations. Acting on vested interests is then assumed to undermine 
the sincerity of the march. It is very hard to determine what were the true reasons behind asylum 
seekers to take action, as they are attributes too closely associated with the subjective states of 
the agents. At least, it is beyond the scope of the kind of investigation I want to pursue here. 
Alternatively, my strategy is to put to question the assumption that vested interests undermine 
the sincerity of the march. 
Crossing the border to Austria would actually serve the interests of asylum seekers not only 
in reaching better living conditions compared to their life at Keleti train station but also in being 
                                                            
7 Matthew Weaver, Mark Rice-Oxley and Nadia Khomami, “Hundreds set off from Budapest on foot”. 
Guardian September 4, 2015. 
8 Daniel Nolan and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Hungarian police order refugees off train heading to 
Austrian border”. Guardian September 3, 2015. 
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able to travel to countries where they believed their asylum application would be better 
received. The common conviction is far from being pointless. The existence of vested interests 
in taking part in an act should surely lead us to approach the professed reasons with caution. It 
should lead us to scrutinize more carefully the reasons for the asylum seekers’ belief that the 
law needs revision and the weight of that belief compared to a case where agents do not have 
interests. Nevertheless, the mere existence of interests does not necessarily undermine the 
sincerity or the seriousness of asylum seeker’s beliefs. The coexistence of interests and a sincere 
and serious belief that the law is unjust does not undermine the degree of conscientiousness of 
the act. Otherwise, we would have the unintuitive conclusion that no agent with vested interests 
can be conscientious.  
Even if we accept that the existence of interests do not rule out the sincerity of the act, it 
may still be necessary for sincerity to determine whether it was the asylum seeker’s belief that 
the law was unjust or their intention to further their interests that lead them to act. The former 
would be an impartial reason to act towards changing an unjust policy, while the latter a partial 
reason for saving merely themselves from its bad implications9. It is also the case that acting on 
impartial reasons usually have more currency in legitimizing an act of civil disobedience in the 
eyes of the public. Yet, before we prioritize one kind of reasons over another, we need to see 
how closely the two are tied in cases such as the march. The asylum seekers’ belief that the 
policy warrants revision first and foremost originates from their perception of the great extent 
that their interests are undermined. Their claim on the European public is exactly that their 
conditions are unacceptable and need to be improved. Acting on the intention to further their 
interests is corollary of acting on the belief that the policy was unjust10. 
We should not be surprised to see such a close relationship between partial and impartial 
reasons in acts of civil disobedience in general. The reason is that acts of civil disobedience are 
very demanding compared to other forms of political action that do not involve breaking the 
law. When a civil disobedient brakes the law, she needs to confront not only the law enforcers, 
but also the disapproval of society for breaking the law. For an agent to carry out an act of civil 
disobedience her reasons should be sufficiently weighty to face its consequences. It is natural 
that such reasons primarily emerge from our concern of things that happen around us and for 
those who are closer to us. When our interests are undermined unjustly we have first hand 
experience of the extent of the injustices. Moreover, we have more at stake in the perpetuation 
of an injustice that we are the victims of. Partial reasons, which ultimately motivate agents to 
acts, are an integral part of acts of civil disobedience that cannot be put aside.   
Contrary to the common conviction on the role of partials reasons, it is the lack of impartial 
reasons that should lead us to doubt the sincerity and seriousness of an act of civil disobedience. 
The impartial reasons, in this case, refer to the moral grounds of asylum seekers’ beliefs that led 
them to take action. If there are no impartial reasons to believe that the situation of asylum 
seekers in Keleti station needs revision and that the law should be breached to improve it, then 
                                                            
9 In a similar way, since the act was conveyed by a group of asylum seekers, there might be those who act 
upon the former reason and others upon the latter.  
10 There are of course other cases where the two kinds of reasons are not so intertwined and acting on the 
partial reasons would undermine the sincerity of act of civil disobedience.  
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we cannot call the march conscientious. Were there such impartial reasons available for asylum 
seekers? This requires a closer look at the circumstances at the Keleti station and the policy that 
has led to it.  
Let me first specify briefly the policies that the march of refugees has violated. The 
immediate object was the established border between Austria and Hungary, visa procedures that 
regulate border crossing and efforts of the Hungarian authorities to block the passage of asylum 
seekers. Nevertheless, by means of the direct act, they also violated the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS); and more specifically, a particular clause of the Dublin III Regulations 
that requires asylum seekers to claim asylum in the first county of entry. Do the implications of 
Dublin III regulations imply an injustice? If they do, are they extensive enough that it requires a 
breach of law?  
The Dublin III Regulations establish the ground rules for determining which Member State 
of the European Union is responsible for an asylum application. It establishes a hierarchy of 
criteria from the most important family unity, to respectively, legal presence of the asylum 
seeker, country of first entry and country of first asylum application (Fratzke 2015, 5). In 
addition, it provides the legal mechanisms that facilitate communication between Member 
States for the criteria to be effectively implemented. (UNHCR 2006, 10) The ultimate aim of 
Dublin III is to prevent the abuse of the asylum systems in the form of multiple applications by 
the same person in several Member States and ensure that asylum seekers have effective access 
to procedures for determining refugee status in line with the1951 Refugee Convention 
commitments of the EU Member States (UNHCR 2006, 4). Since its first implementation, 
theorists have brought to attention two major problems with the Dublin III. The first problem is 
the misplaced assumption that asylum systems of each Member State are similarly sufficient 
with regards to the protection of the 1951 Refugee Convention rights of refugees. As Evangelia 
Tsourdi and Phillppe De Bruycker point out, recognition rates and reception conditions vary 
significantly depending of differences of economic development and investment in social 
assistance systems (2015, 4). Practices in Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and Hungary have been 
repeatedly challenged by the UNHCR and other rights advocates (Fratzke 2015, 16). 
Specifically, there are problems regarding poor reception conditions and dysfunctional asylum 
procedures, subjection of the illegal entrees to prolonged detention periods, inhumane 
treatments, and inadequate respect for the criterion of family unity (Fratzke 2015, 11, 17, 19). In 
addition to assessment reports by the European Commission, a significant number of cases have 
been brought up to national courts as well as European Court of Justice and European Court of 
Human Rights, leading to decisions that implied reform of national practices in the 
implementation of the Dublin III. The second problem is that Dublin III places unfair burdens 
on the bordering states of the EU such as Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary where the asylum 
seekers from the Middle East region usually make first entry. According to the last two criteria 
established by Dublin III, these countries are responsible for the asylum applications of those 
who have irregularly entered the EU territory and who do not have family members residing in 
any of the member states. It is also true that the border countries such as Greece, Bulgaria and 
Hungary are relatively less affluent then are the rest of EU member states, which contributes to 
the malfunctioning of asylum systems.  
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These two problems have reached a considerable extent in the face of the great number of 
asylum seekers arriving at the borders of Europe since 2015. In accordance with Dublin III, 
hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers entering the EU through the Balkan route are to be 
assessed by border countries like Hungary, which do not have the resources to sustain an 
adequate response. When Hungarian authorities blocked all means of transportation out of the 
country to implement the Dublin criteria, thousands accumulated in the Keleti train station 
crystallizing the foreseen problems. The train station was turned into a makeshift refugee camp 
where asylum seekers including children and elderly lived in tents during a heat wave without 
any infrastructure, adequate fresh water, sanitation or health care. Their living conditions and 
inability to access the Hungarian system of asylum were far from their rights specified by 1951 
Refugee Convention. The reasons for asylum seekers to believe that the policy needs revision 
are in this sense impartial. The impartiality is also implied by the assessments of European 
institutions and decisions by the European courts that have found previous malfunctionings of 
the Dublin III unacceptable. Moreover, the asylum seekers’ predicament was unjust also 
because it was caused by the implementation of a particular clause of the Dublin III that can 
actually be revised. By illegally crossing the border between Austria and Hungary and 
demanding that they should be allowed to travel to Germany and Sweden, the asylum seekers 
pointed at one possible way to enhance their circumstances and relieve the causes of the 
injustice. 
The last aspect regarding sincerity of the march concerns the impartiality of asylum seekers 
reasons to break the law instead of choosing another kind of political action. Even if there were 
impartial reasons to believe that the policy needed to be changed, were there impartial reasons 
to breach the law? The most salient reason for breaking the law as an act of civil disobedience is 
the belief that it is the right way to convey what the agent believes to be unjust. As David 
Lefkowitz emphasizes, it “must be reasonable for those who commit such acts to believe that by 
doing so they will be able to communicate to (some of) their political leaders and fellow citizens 
their beliefs regarding the moral acceptability of the state’s current exercise of authority” 
(Lefkowitz 2007, 215-216). In answering this question we need to look more closely to the 
circumstances in which the act took place as well as the way it was carried out11. This 
discussion takes us already to the second feature of a paradigm case of civil disobedience, 
namely its communicative aspect.  
2.2 Was the march communicative? 
Let me begin by introducing a number of distinctions useful to highlight the communicative 
aspects of the march.  First, an act of civil disobedience has both backward and forward looking 
aims. In addition, communication has diverse audiences such as the victims of the injustice, 
society at large and third parties. Brownlee states that the backward-looking aims are “to 
communicate both a disavowal of, and dissociation from, a given law or policy and the reasons 
for that disavowal” (Brownlee 2012, 531). The march of refugees, in this sense, conveys to both 
the European public and other asylum seekers that not everyone accepts the current predicament 
                                                            
11 Here we see the link between conscientiousness and communication: an act is conscientious only if it is 
communicative to an adequate degree. 
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of asylum seekers. The forward-looking aims, on the other hand, are “to draw attention to the 
issue and to the reasons for the protest so as to persuade the relevant audience to accept the 
disobedient’s position and, thereby, to instigate a lasting change in law or policy” (Brownlee 
2012, 531). The main audience here is the European public at large with the hope of building 
support for policy change. The march of refugees was carried out in the midst of an ongoing 
situation where thousands of asylum seekers were daily landing on the EU territory and 
following the same route as the asylum seekers in Keleti. By bringing into attention that their 
current predicament, asylum seekers called for support from the European public towards 
reform of the policy. Such a reform would apply not only to current situation of asylum seekers 
in the Keleti station, but also to those who are following in their path12. Another audience of the 
forward-looking aim is the third parties such as other communities, governments or 
transnational organizations with similar policies of asylum.  Brownlee observers that the aim of 
addressing third parties is to make them “realise that the kind of dissent they observe elsewhere 
could arise within their own borders” (Brownlee 2004, 347-348). Since the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, there has been a number of interpretation of the rights of refugees recognized in 
different parts of the globe. Organizations such as African Unity (OAU) have drafted 
conventions to address asylum situations by building on past experience. In this sense, the 
march of refugees has a further communicative aspect for contributing to reforms on other parts 
of the world today and in the future.  
Such transformative aims, nevertheless, are hard to achieve. As Brownlee points out, policy 
change consists in leading ”policymakers not only to reform existing law, but also to internalise 
the reasons behind the dissenter’s condemnation and disavowal of that law” (Brownlee 2004, 
347). This is only possible by engaging society as well as policy makers through moral 
dialogue. How can a breach of law even initiate a moral dialogue or convince others of the 
reasons for the act towards gaining their support? If an act of civil disobedience has any 
prospects of transforming public opinion, it needs to be tailored in the right way. Was the march 
of refugees such an act?  
To begin with, an act is a suitable address to society at large when it is employed as a last 
resort. If there are alternative routes to bring the issue on public discussion that do not require a 
breach of law, then there is a presumption to choose that course of action rather than the breach 
of law13. This condition might be too strong, for in many cases such as the march the extent of 
the injustice require the swiftest response possible to deter further harm. Yet it is still relevant to 
ask if the asylum seekers have “sought to play any role in society’s deliberations about the law 
at issue” (Brownlee 2012, 533). If they have not previously sought to engage society through 
legal ways, then the breach of law may be an obstacle to initiate moral dialogue. Although, 
being non-members, asylum seekers do not have any right to directly participate in the 
deliberations for shaping the EU asylum policy, decision making mechanisms of the EU are 
open to civil society participation. Indeed, various advocate groups including UNHCR have 
                                                            
12 Even if the result was an exemption from the Dublin Regulation, those that follow can also benefit 
from the exemption so far as they are in similar circumstances.  
13 This point is commonly presupposed my most theorists except for philosophical anarchists who refuse 
the presumption to obey the authority of the state in the first place.  
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repeatedly pointed to the problems with the Dublin III regulations at the EU level14. The 
outcome was not satisfactory. As the reasons behind the predicament of asylum seekers were 
not adequately addressed, circumstances deteriorated daily.  One instance among many was the 
make shift refugee camp around the Keleti station. Rather than an obstacle, the breach of law 
surfaces as a necessary choice for initiating moral dialogue towards a swift response.  
Another condition of a communicative act is the existence of a significant potential of 
achieving its aim. The benefits of the act should always outweigh the damage done by 
breaching the law. If the circumstances at the time are not favorable, then there are no good 
reasons for breaching the law. Whether the act has the potential to fulfill its aims primarily 
depends on the means and mode of communication, which I will discuss as the third condition. 
Yet, it also depends on the conditions of the audience. In Brownlee’s words, “the success of 
communication depends as much upon the hearer as it does upon the speaker” (Brownlee 2004, 
343). Were the conditions at the time of the march suitable enough for the breach of law to start 
a moral dialogue? I think they were for two reasons. First, at the time of the act, the attention of 
the European public was significantly focused on the plight of asylum seekers due to media 
images of the tragic events that took place in the previous week of the march. Solidarity 
campaigns and demonstrations were organized in cities across Europe in order to raise 
awareness on the problems surrounding the asylum seekers15. Networks such as Berlin Based 
Refugees Welcome that aim to meet the needs of refugees were gaining major support16. 
Second, asylum seekers had witnessed that the policy makers were responsive to public 
demands. The public pressure that had built up in the previous week lead Austrian and 
Hungarian authorities to waive visa checks as an emergency response to what they took to be a 
humanitarian situation17. The conditions were in place both for the act to gain support by the 
society in general and such a support to materialize into concrete policy change.  
Last but not least, for an act to be communicative the means and mode of communication 
should be suitable for initiating moral dialogue. The means and mode of an act vary: it may be 
direct or indirect, public or non-public, violent or non-violent, or it may or may not respect the 
law. What are the proper means and mode of an act has been a matter of extensive debate in the 
literature18. The scope of disagreement suggests that for each case we need to look at the 
                                                            
14 The revision of the Dublin Regulations in 2013 (Dublin III) is the latest step in the development of the 
CEAS. Although it has built on the experiences of two previous legal frameworks that have been 
established by the Dublin Convention in 1990 and the Dublin Regulation in 2003 (Dublin II), the 
outcome of the reform did not suffice to resolve the problems associated with the great number of arrivals 
from the beginning of 2015.  
15 Guardian, “Vienna stages protest welcoming refugees” Guardian, September 1, 2015. 
16 Jessica Elgot, “Airbnb for refugees’ group overwhelmed by offers of help” Guardian, September 1, 
2015. 
17 Guardian “Packed trains reach Germany as refugee visa checks are waived” Guardian, September 1, 
2015.  
18 Rawls, for example, has offered an account of civil disobedience with a specific form. He argued that 
civil disobedience should be public. It should never be covert or secretive. The actors should engage with 
the act openly with fair notice to the authorities. Moreover, the act should be non-violent. The actors 
should shy away from any use of violence, especially against persons. Finally, they should be respectful 
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particular act and judge whether there are good reasons to believe that the choice of the mode 
and means of communication serves to initiate moral dialogue. The march of the refugees was 
public: asylum seekers have made their intentions of crossing the border between Austria and 
Hungary explicit long before they could actually carry out the act. This choice has reinforced 
the communicative aspect of the act in comparison with an alternative course of action of 
crossing the border discreetly and making an ex ante announcement. In fact, the marching of the 
asylum seekers during day under live media coverage has played a big role in the act reaching a 
positive outcome. Many European citizens that witnessed the march tried to aid the asylum 
seekers by bringing supplies or assisting them with their vehicles. Moreover, the march was not 
violent. The Hungarian authorities responded by waiving visa controls and providing 
transportation for those who were on the march as well as those who were still at the Keleti 
station. In the end, asylum seekers never had to confront the border authorities. Had the 
authorities responded differently, there could have taken place minor clashes with the border 
police or forcing of the fences. Since the beginning of 2015 there has been such confrontations 
between asylum seekers and authorities in a number of occasion. These instances, nevertheless, 
did not impede the communicative aspect of the act. The asymmetry between the means of the 
border police and asylum seekers have, on the contrary, fueled the sympathy of the public for 
the plight of asylum seekers. Lastly, crossing the border between Austrian and Hungary without 
registration or possession of a visa, was a direct act in breaching of the Dublin III regulations. It 
was designed as performative in highlighting the problems with the border policy and also 
creating a symbol for the future acts.  
The march was a direct non-violent public act that respected the law. It was carried out as a 
last resort with significant potential for success at a time when there was considerable attention 
from the European public. If the arguments so far are convincing, the march was 
communicative enough to initiate moral dialogue. It was also conscientious, for the belief that 
the predicament of asylum seekers is unjust and requires a breach of law was serious and 
sincere. These two features give us ample reasons to consider the march of refugees as a 
paradigmatic case of civil disobedience. Yet, this does not conclude our case. We also need to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
of the law, ready to face the legal consequences of their actions, including punishment (Rawls 1999, 319-
323). Yet, each aspect of Rawls account has been challenged. Among others, Brian Smart pointed out that 
publicity might put in danger the act to be performed at all. For legal authorities and those who politically 
oppose the cause of the civil disobedient might take preventive measure against the act. Rather, it should 
be enough for the actors to announce the act as well as the reasons for the act after the act has taken place 
(Smart 1999, 206). Browlee emphasized that a common sense conception of violence would consider a 
number of acts that risk but do not necessarily cause injury or damage as violent such as “catapulting 
stuffed animals at the police or shooting into the sky” (Brownlee 2012, 530). Thus overemphasis on 
violence would exclude a number of acts that would nevertheless be a good way to address society. 
Joseph Raz argued that non-violent acts “may well have much more severe consequences than many an 
act of violence: consider the possible effects of a strike by ambulance drivers” (Raz 1976, 267). John 
Simmons pointed out that a violent act can be an appropriate political act if it “is carefully presented to 
the public as protest, if it is isolated (an unusual act in an otherwise non-violent life), if it has been 
preceded by passive political efforts, and if it is followed by non-evasion and acceptance of punishment” 
(Simmons 2010,1808). Finally, it is not clear why in all cases it should be more communicative if the 
civil disobedient should be ready to accept punishment. 
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show that asylum seekers had a moral right to engage in an act of civil disobedience; that they 
were entitled to break the law. Otherwise, as non-members, the claims asylum seekers aim to 
bring into deliberation in European public would significantly be undermined.  
3. Refugees’ right to civil disobedience 
Let me begin by emphasizing with Joseph Raz the distinction between cases where one is 
morally justified to carry out an act and where one has a moral right to do so. Raz writes that 
 
“It is an essential element of rights to action that they entitle one to do that which one should 
not. To say this is not, of course, to say that the purpose or justification of rights of action is to 
increase wrongdoing. Their purpose is to develop and protect the autonomy of the agent. They 
entitle him to choose for himself rightly or wrongly. But they cannot do that unless they entitle 
him to choose wrongly”. (1979, 266-267). 
 
If we grant the right to civil disobedience to asylum seekers, then the march can be morally 
justified in virtue of such a right, rather than the content of the claims of asylum seekers. In 
other words, asylum seekers would be morally entitled to breach the law whether or not their 
claims are justified. In practice, this would imply that those who do not agree with the act 
should still tolerate it. Moreover, public authorities would have no claim to prevent the act from 
happening or punish the asylum seekers who carried it out (Raz 1979, 274). In what grounds 
can we establish the right to civil disobedience of asylum seekers? 
The moral right to civil disobedience is usually discussed with reference to citizens’ right to 
political participation. The main assumption is that a liberal democracy, which has a justified 
claim to political authority, guarantees citizens’ participation in collective decision making 
procedures. When decisions are made by a liberal democratic state, citizens have a prima facie 
duty to obey the law. An act of civil disobedience conflicts with this duty so far as it is a breach 
of law that has been implemented by a legitimate process.  
For Raz, this conflict can never be resolved in favor of a right to civil disobedience in liberal 
democracies. He points out that the right to political participation is not absolute, but limited. 
Such a limitation does not arise due to the political objectives that agents seek, but due to other 
agents’ right to political participation (Raz 1979, 271). What is at issue here is the rightful 
means of citizens to put forth their political objectives in public deliberation. If the aim of the 
agent is to instigate political change, given that the right to political participation is protected by 
a state, the agent is required to choose legal means. Thus, there can be no right to civil 
disobedience derivable from the right to political participation in liberal societies. (Raz 1979, 
273). 
David Lefkowitz, on the contrary, argues that the moral right to political participation 
implies two correlative rights: “one a right to participate in the decision process itself, say by 
casting a vote in a majority rule procedure, and one a right to continue to contest the decision 
reached by such a process after the fact by a variety of means, including suitably constrained 
civil disobedience” (2007, 213). Lefkowitz’s argues for the latter right based on the observation 
that actual functionings of decision-making mechanisms are not as effective as Raz hopes them 
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to be. Mechanisms such as parliamentary democracies are designed for citizens to make 
collective decisions in the context of reasonable disagreements regarding political objectives. 
Yet, the unbalance of power between groups create persistent and vulnerable minorities who are 
not able to adequately voice and advocate their points of view. The discrepancy of power 
coupled with constraints of time and resources lead to outcomes different than what might have 
turned out if there were equal means and more time. In such cases, those groups who have not 
been able to make their cases sufficiently have the right to continue detesting the law. 
(Lefkowitz 2007, 213-214).  
According to Lefkowitz “the best understanding of the moral right to political participation 
is one that reduces as much as possible the degree to which it is a matter of luck whether one 
attracts majority support for one’s reasonable views regarding what justice requires” (Lefkowitz 
2007, 215), Civil disobedience is a good way to attract majority support. As Brownlee notes “It 
can often better engage with society and the state than legal protest can since the added 
sensationalism of civil disobedience, even when suitably constrained and modest in form, tends 
to garner greater publicity than do lawful defenses of minority views” (Brownlee 2012, 531). 
Although Raz might be right in an ideal world, we still need a right to civil disobedience in non-
ideal circumstances. If societies aim to treat each citizen equally, civil disobedience is an 
integral part of political participation. 
Even if we can argue for the right to civil disobedience on the right to political participation 
as Lefkowitz does, it is not clear if such a path is available for us in establishing the right to 
civil disobedience to asylum seekers who are non-members. The obvious problem is that liberal 
democratic states of today are nation states accountable only to its members. They are under no 
obligation to guarantee non-members a voice in the decision-making processes. The citizens of 
the state determine the criteria of membership in virtue of their membership interests. There are 
various, and commonly acknowledged, reasons against accepting outsiders as members such as 
protections of society’s culture, democratic commitments and so on19. If the benefits of 
including a non-member do not significantly outweigh such reasons, then the way to inclusion 
is sealed. The same is true also for the EU, which is ultimately accountable only to the citizens 
of its Member States. Although asylum seekers are within the territory of the EU and under it’s 
the political authority, they are not members. They have no right to participate in the decision-
making mechanisms in the first place.  
A number of cosmopolitan accounts aim to expand the members’ right of political 
participation to non-members. They argue that such an expansion is necessary to address 
particular problems where “a democratic state contains no representatives of the communities 
that suffer the – direct or indirect – consequences of the policies it employs” (Archibugi 2003, 
9). The predicament of asylum seekers is of a similar issue. The conditions and means through 
which asylum seekers are able to enjoy their Convention rights are determined by governing 
bodies where they are not represented. According to cosmopolitans, the expansion of the right 
to political participation can be facilitated by the development of global democratic institutions 
that involve citizens’ of the world in the decision-making procedures. In these institutions of 
global scale, nevertheless, the imbalances of power and limitations of time and resources would 
                                                            
19 For a comprehensive discussion of such reasons, see David Miller (2016).  
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even be larger than national or regional context. There would inevitably be some groups that 
voice their views better than others. In turn, a right to political participation in global 
institutions would also have to include a correlative right to civil disobedience at the global 
level.  
Although such a cosmopolitan project might be the right way to go, it is still at its infancy. I 
for one believe that extending political participation beyond national or regional context for 
issues such as migration will bring more justice. Yet, until the time such a global right to 
political participation is consolidated politically, we still need to find some alternative 
grounding for non-member’s right to civil disobedience. Moreover, this grounding needs to be 
ecumenical: It has to be reasonable to both cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans within a 
framework of political participation based on nation states. To this end, in the rest of the 
section, I will first offer a consequentialist justification of the march and then point out why it 
needs to be established as a right.  
The consequentialist justification I propose, following Amartya Sen, takes into account 
comprehensive outcomes of acts. Comprehensive outcomes refer not only to outcomes, but also 
to how these outcomes have come to be, including agencies, relations and processes (Sen 2009, 
219). The moral justification is based on both aspects. In other words, the march is morally 
justifiable, first, if the role of asylum seekers, their relations to others and the means they have 
used are justifiable; and second, if the act leads to a more preferable social state. I believe the 
previous discussion on the conscientiousness and communicative aspects of the march suffice to 
justify the agencies, relations and processes that are involved. Does the social state the march 
lead to is morally preferable? 
My contention is that acts of civil disobedience by non-members are valuable tools for 
societies to reconsider their set of values towards discarding those that might be grounded on 
local parochialism rather than reflection. Brownlee notes that there “is a distinctive social value 
in conscientious dissent and disobedience. These practices contribute centrally to the democratic 
exchange of ideas by forcing the champions of dominant opinion to reflect upon and defend 
their views” (Brownlee 2012, 538). In addition to the non-instrumental right of minorities to 
continue dissent, there is an epistemic value of their acts in taking moral reasoning further and 
enabling the public to reach more informed decisions. This epistemic value is independent of 
the non-instrumental justification of the right to civil disobedience. Why not benefit from such 
instrumental and epistemic value that can be gained by contestation of non-members? Why stop 
at the borders of the EU? 
Amartya Sen maintains that including in the deliberation only the viewpoints of those 
dissenters that are members have important limitations. He points out that "If we live in a local 
world of fixed beliefs and specific practices, parochialism may be an unrecognized and 
unquestioned result” (Sen 2009, 130). A particular focal group such as the European public may 
be prone to containing local prejudices that cannot be revealed by scrutiny of the same focal 
group. The remedy consists in including the views and experiences of those who are distant as 
they are useful in identifying the limitations by bringing in new experiences (Sen 2009, 130). 
The experiences of non-members bring out new ways the questions can be assessed from novel 
social positions. They reflect what can be seen from their unique social experiences. The 
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perceptions of asylum seekers produce distinct reasonings that may not be available to 
majorities within the EU. In addition, limits of resources and time may prevent the European 
public to reach out and incorporate such experiences into their deliberations of political 
objectives. In such cases, acts of civil disobedience by non-members are beneficial to convey 
the information that enhances political deliberation. The communicative aspect of the march 
serves this purpose well by getting the attention of the public swiftly and initiating a moral 
dialogue.  
For example, there are at least two entrenched opinions regarding the current situation of 
asylum seekers in the European public that has been put to question by the march of refugees. 
First, it is commonly assumed that the intentions of asylum seekers who attempt to reach 
Germany and Sweden are inconsistent with the idea of being a refugee. Their actions are 
interpreted as pursuing better lives in more affluent countries, rather than overcoming problems 
of statelessness and inadequate basic needs. The march, nevertheless, contested this contention. 
Asylum seekers brought to the fore their own experiences of malfunctioning Dublin III. They 
compelled the European public to reflect on what it means to be an asylum seeker in the current 
situation. They brought to light the circumstances in Keleti where they are not able to 
effectively enjoy both their Convention and Human Rights and what they are willing to risk 
overcoming it.  
Second, it is commonly assumed that asylum seekers who are coming from the Middle East 
Region do not share the democratic culture that binds people of Europe together. They lack a 
commitment to toleration and respect, which is essential to sustain the institutions of Europe. 
The way the march was designed and carried out contests this opinion. As I have emphasized, it 
was carried out as a last resort by appropriate mode and means designed to initiate moral 
dialogue. The asylum seekers demanded toleration and respect by a democratically recognized 
means of political action. They have made themselves visible to the European public as political 
agents ready to engage with the rest of the population20.  
Both entrenched opinions figure an important role in the European public’s perception of the 
European asylum policy and the response of the institutions to the novel circumstances since 
2015. Political groups that campaigned against the reception of the asylum seekers within the 
EU territory have frequently invoked both beliefs. The march has a significant epistemic value 
for both creating a juncture and providing a novel perspective to reconsidering them. In 
accordance with the consequentialist approach I propose, this value can provide a moral 
justification for the act of civil disobedience. Can it also ground a moral right to civil 
disobedience?  
In the beginning of this section, I have emphasized with Raz that what distinguishes a moral 
right to act is that it entitles the actor to the act whether or not the act is right or wrong. This 
implied that asylum seekers would be entitled to breach the law independently of the content of 
their claim, in this case, whether or not their predicament is unjust. I have also pointed out that 
the reform of the Dublin III has been a matter of intensive debate. Competing proposals have 
                                                            
20 In the words of Isin, although they are not European citizens they have enacted European citizenship 
(Isin 2013).  
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been raised as a response to asylum seekers arriving from the Middle East region21. It is not 
clear whether allowing asylum seekers to claim asylum in whichever country they demand leads 
to long-term solutions22. Yet, this does not undermine its epistemic value of the march. The 
unique experience asylum seekers bring into the deliberation is valuable so far as it initiates 
reflection on the values of society, not in virtue of their belief being correct. The European 
public may decide, in the end, that an alternative reform suits better with the overall values of 
society and bring more justice. It is the exclusive right of the European citizens to participate in 
determining the policies that govern the European institutions. The part played by the act of 
civil disobedience by non-members is to ignite the discussion and enlarge the information pool 
available to public uses in making political decisions. Moreover, the best use of the epistemic 
value can be achieved by allowing all conscientious and communicative acts of civil 
disobedience to be carried out regardless of the correctness of their beliefs. In this sense, act of 
civil disobedience by non-members should be protected by a right to civil disobedience. 
4. Conclusion: Refugees as political agents 
Since 2015, the plight of asylum seekers has been perceived solely as a humanitarian crisis 
where asylum seekers desperately wait to receive aid and protection. The march from the Keleti 
Station to the Austrian borders was a step towards disrupting this perception. When asylum 
seekers took action, they not only claimed the effective implementation of their rights but also a 
political agency that so far has been held back from them.  
Lea Ypi describes political agency as obtaining when,  
 
“it is both feasible, that is, relevant political, legal and social mechanisms are in place to 
operate the necessary changes in the system, and when the outcome of political action is 
sustainable, that is, it has a chance to survive without disrupting existing social ties, and it 
generates a sense of the collective that is likely to endure throughout time” (Ypi 2012, 131). 
 
In this article, I provide a way to think about the struggle of asylum seekers as feasible in 
both senses Ypi describes.  
In Section Two, I argue that the march is both conscientious and communicative and 
therefore displays to an adequate degree the features of a paradigm case of civil disobedience. 
These features gain substance in the context of an already exiting framework of European 
institutions including the CEAS, the ECHR and the ECJ that govern and monitor European 
asylum policy. In this sense, the political and legal mechanisms were in place to initiate the 
necessary changes in the European asylum system. In addition, I point out that a significant part 
of the European public has been involved with the predicament of asylum seekers that make the 
journey through Europe. Activist European citizens were not only receptive to the claims of 
asylum seekers, but have also undertaken initiatives to assist them in many instances. This 
shows that the social mechanisms for a substantial change were also in place.  
                                                            
21 For example, see the discussion around the new EU plan on migration policy (Cellini 2016). 
22 Specifically, there is an ongoing debate around pull factors of more welcoming asylum policies. For 
example, see the discussion by Philippe Fargues. (2015, 3-4). 
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In Section Three, I delineate a distinct epistemic value of the march that enables the 
European public to better realize their right to political participation in determining the policies 
that govern European institutions. The epistemic value as the outcome of the march, rather than 
disrupting the existing social ties, reinforces them. Moreover, the proposed right to civil 
disobedience to asylum seekers, which I argue is essential to sustain such epistemic value, 
builds a connection between the asylum seekers and the European public towards generating a 
collective that is likely to endure.  
Articulating refugees as novel political agents in the European political landscape and the 
march as an act of civil disobedience has important implications. It calls for toleration by those 
who do not agree with the claims and beliefs of asylum seekers. It also gives the authorities a 
reason to refrain from preventive measures as well as punishments. But more importantly, it 
establishes the moral status of refugees as any other citizen and compels the European public to 
take their claims for justice as seriously as any other political agent.  
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